Introduction: Anthropological Reformations -Anthropology in the Era of Reformation
The present volume is comprised of papers submitted to the third annual RefoRC conference, which took place in Berlin in 2013. The general topic of this conference "Anthropological Reformations -Anthropology in the Era of Reformation" marks the cardinal point of interdisciplinary discussions on the state of anthropological questions. It wasour aim to ask for the (pre)conditions of the reformatory process, its historical embedment and transformatived ynamics with regard to the establishment and the debates on anthropological concepts and theirchanges in the age of Reformation. To analyse these developments and the differentareas of conflict in acomprehensivew ay, we intended to confront features of special research fields (Medicine, Musicology,History, Literature, Art History, Politics, Ethics, Theology and History of Religion) enabling us to compare the conceptualizations of the conditio humana according i. e. to the relation of body and soul, definitions of self-consciousness, knowledge or the understanding of free will, to concepts of body and theories of passionso r emotions. How did theologians reflect on the scientific explanation of man's affectivenature and the role of emotions?Inwhich waydid contemporary scientific knowledge on the one side, the humanistic reception of ancient sources, pagan literature and philosophy on the other side influence the theological issue of humans' godlikeness, the comprehensiono fv irtues, guilty pleasures or sin? How were anthropological concepts, based on philosophical discourses, founded by the explorations of the contemporary empirical sciences or on travelling records with regard to the so-called new worlds received by theologians?A nd how did anthropological questions touch the interrelation of law and grace, justification and salvation?T ow hich degree does the influence of reformatory theological debates (i. e. the interpretation of Christ'sp assion, death, redemption, resurrection) modifythe conception of man'sstate?Looking into the relevance of anthropologicalr eformations in ab roader sense, we not onlye xamine shifts in the structure of theological systems, the strategies to legitimize the true church or to substantiate the reformatory understanding of faith. Analyzing the theological approaches and appropriations of contemporary thought as well as the wisdom of rediscovered traditions, we also want to investigate to what extent and in which waytheological debates on human nature havefound resonance in works of art, poetry, literature, music, scientific knowledge etc. Is it possible to describe ar eformation of aesthetic concepts,t hat means as hifti n theories and practicesofart (literature, music, architecture, the art of painting, up to performativea rts)?A nd what does this mean for religious and liturgical practices?
How can we describe the interrelation or the reciprocal transfer of concepts and ideas in the wake of Reformation and in the long run with regard to the period of confessionalization?T his perspectivea lso focuses on political and social changes, for example the review of monastic life, the criticisms of the papal church and the emergence of religious movements. The impact of the Reformation and the later Counterreformation manifests the influence of religious thought on politicalaswell as social theories and had apractical impact on social life, on debates focusing the true Christian conduct of life and their ethical implications. But it also leads to legitimation strategies to confirm the theological substantiation of politicalgovernments.
On the whole, all these questions concentrate on the complexity of anthropological reformations. The conference papers combinedinthis volume attempt to giveanswers to these questions. But first and foremost theyexplore the deeper dimensions of anthropological changes and open our mind for different perspectives on anthropology in the era of Reformation.
The volume combinesselected papers of relevant experts with the research work of young graduate or postgraduate scholars. It tries to encourage at ransdisciplinary, international discussion focused on exemplary case studies as well as systematic points of view. Thanks to the outstanding commitment of all participantso ft he conference, we are able to present the results of this discussion, ar ich and comprehensives pectrum of research work, which will encourage further research.
First of all we havetothank the contributors of this volume for their inspiring papers, shedding light on anthropologyinthe era of Reformation. They lead to a deeper understanding of the transformativeforces, historical changes and sociopolitical developments which characterizet he role of anthropological debates within the processofR eformationand may initiate acontinuing research with regard to ap lurality of consequences and conflicts concerningn ot onlyt heological or confessional conceptualizations of the conditio humana but, as the transdisciplinary conference has shown, taking into consideration anthropological Reformations in acomprehensivew ay. It is this exchange across disciplinary borders that allows us to see how anthropologyi nt he era of Reformation spreads out in all fields of sciences and arts, politics, ethics or human self-conceptiona nd substantiates claims of the only true church as well as apprehensions of resurrection and the promisedafterlife in Christian thought.
We are deeply grateful that the Bundesbeauftragte für Kultur und Medien supported the international conference generously and made ap romptp ublication of the conference paperspossible. We also thank the publishing house Va ndenhoeck & Ruprecht for accepting the volume as part of aseries of RefoRCconference-paper-editions and we especially thank Jörg Persch and Christoph Spill for supporting the publication of this volume. Last but not least we want to thank Pawel Kaliszewski, who assisted the editors in preparing all the manuscripts so unfailingly and reliably.
Sincere thanks are given to them all. The theme of akrasia is usually considered to havei ts origins in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics,(EN, Book VII), in which Aristotle discusses the phenomenon of acting against one'sown better judgment.Since knowledge is stronger than opinions or emotions, and since better judgmentsrepresent this knowledge, no rational person should act against whatheorshe considers best. Aristotleis, however, not only intellectualist but also realist;therefore, he remarks that often people nevertheless seem to act akratically. How can this phenomenon be explained?A ristotle presents al engthy elaboration and explanation. Later philosophers and theologians haved ebated what Aristotlei sa ctually saying and whether he is right in saying what he says.
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Akrasia in Aristotle and the Stoa
As one crucial part of his explanation, Aristotlelaunches the practical syllogism, acalculativemodel of the emergence of human action. The practical syllogism consists of am ajorp remise that expressesageneral principle and am inor premise that states aparticular observation. Given the intellectualist framework, rational beings should follow the conclusion implied by the twop remises. Aristotle'sf amous example in EN VII concerns eating: 'Sweet things are to be avoided' (major); 'thisissweet' (minor); 'this should be avoided' (conclusion). The conclusion is not only propositional,but also functional and in some sense the action itself. Hence, aperson'sacts result from his or her calculativedeliberations in terms of practical syllogism. (EN VII, 1145a -1147b).
The standard Aristotelian answer to the problem of akrasia is that the akratic person knows the good in auniversal sense but his grasp of the minor premise is impeded or imperfect. Thus, the akratic person eats the sweets, knowing that sweet things should generally be avoided, but cheating himself to ignore the particular case at hand. (EN VII, 1147a -b). Obviously, the next thing to ask is whether the ignorance in question is voluntary or not. Agreat range of different answers has been presented, and sometimes the same author has presented many answers. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, says that philosophically such behavior is like involuntary forgetting, but theologically it is voluntary. 3 In addition to Aristotle, there is aS toic tradition of akrasia of which the scholars havebecome better aware duringthe last fifteenyears. 4 The Stoic tradition is quite fragmentary; we haves ome texts of Chrysippus and Galen, and uncertain mentions from Plutarch, Epictetusand Origen. Iamalso arguing in my new bookthat Augustine is in some ways connected to this tradition. 5 The Stoic tradition survives in some examples, of which the twomost popular are, first, 'the runner who cannot stop running' and,second, the literary figure of Medea who falls in loveand kills her children against her better judgment. Both Medea'sloveand her rage are used as example of akrasia. The Stoics introduced the concept of assenttotheir anthropology. This assentw as no freewill in the modern sense, but something that is immediately attached to the judgment of the mind. According to the Stoics, our emotions are assentedjudgments. When we feel an emotion, we havealready judged to assent to it. Emotions are no innocent desires but assented judgments. Thus the Stoics arei ns omes ense even more intellectualist that the Aristotelians who taught that the emotions stem from the lower parts of the soul, being in themselves no rational judgment or voluntary consent of higher mental powers. 6 As strict intellectualists, the Stoics are unwilling to admit that there exists somethingl ike akrasia. Motivational mental conflicts only mean that the assented judgment oscillates and changes in both directions so rapidly that we cannot notice the individual instances of this rapid change. However, in each individual instanceoft his very rapid oscillation there is acoherence of assent, judgment and the emotion representing them. However, the Stoics discuss twopossible options of akrasia. First, there may be so-called prepassions,which emerge already before judgment.IfIsee abox of sweets in the shop window, this impression may cause tiny physical changes within me before the judgment,assent and emotion are fully formed in the soul. Such tiny changes could be labeled as akratic, and we may havethem for av ery brief time before the conscious judgment emerges. Although the doctrineo f prepassions becameprominent in later Christian monastic spirituality, the other option is more interesting for the purposes of this paper. In some cases, the agent may be so strongly predetermined by some earlier habits that the new information cannot change his or her course of action immediately but only after delay. This is what the example of the 'runner who cannot stop running' illustrates. After the assented judgment to stop running, the runner proceedsatleast for some meters. This proceeding might be called akrasia, acting against one's own better judgment. Jörn Müller hasm eticulouslya nalyzedt he Stoict radition of akrasia;h ea lso discussesi ts relationshipt os omee arlyC hristian mental conflicts, fori nstance, Paul'sintrospectioninRomans7.Inmyown book,Ipresent twonew arguments concerning Augustine'sverycomplex role in this story. First, Iclaim that Augustine'sf amousconversionstory in Confessions 8d isplayssimilaritieswiththe exampleofthe 'runner whocannotstop running'.HereAugustine wonderswhy the commandmento ft he mind to will does notb ring aboutawill-act,c alling this powerlesswillamonstrosity. He explains thephenomenonbysayingthat, though themindisliftedupbytruth,itisalsoweigheddownheavily by habit, anditisthis oldh abit whichc ausest he person to acta gainst hisb etterw illa nd judgment. 10 Second, Ii nterpret the late Augustine'sp essimistic lines of the remaining sinfulness of Christians as saying that Augustine there regards concupiscence not only as irrational emotionbut also in termsofanassented judgment.Becausewe feel concupiscence, we have somehow already assented to it; therefore, the awareness of one'sf eeling concupiscence is already in itself sinful, involving preceding consent in some sense. In fact, the case of Augustine is very complex. His doctrineofdesire, consent and freewill cannot be reduced to Stoicism but it also exemplifies new developments. At the same time, the notion of consent/ assent stems from Stoicism and we may ask to what extent this shapes Augustine'sthinking. Timo Nisula discusses Augustine in detail, without fully agreeing with my views regarding his Stoicism. 11 For my purposes, it is sufficient to show that Augustine can be read in somewhat Stoic terms. This is relevant in the reception history irrespectively of whether this wast he case with the historical Augustine.
Other Introductory Perspectives
Some introductory perspectives need to be stated clearly, before Ican enter the topic.
First,i ti se vident that since Melanchthont he Reformation authors knew much morea bout Stoicism than wast he case in late medieval scholasticism. Several Reformation authors kneww ell the non-religious Greek sources and could thus compare their theology competently with the classical heritage. Thus, we havenot only Aristotelianism but also akindofN eo-Stoicism as an available option in the Reformation era.
Second,Iwill not claim that the Reformation authors were either Aristotelians or Stoics. They differedfrom both in many important respects. However, some of them areA ristotelian in their explanation of akrasia, whereas others employ distinctly Neo-Stoic features. While they all remain somewhere between Aristotle and the Stoa, it is worthwhile to discover the individual affinities and differences.
Third,tov erifysuch discoveries we need aclear framework of relevant comparisons. For this purpose, Iwill employ acategorization of the differentmodels of akrasia as being either Aristotelian or Stoic. The use of practical syllogism as explanatorymodel is typical of Aristotelianism. Within this model, one may have slightly different explanations as to how the syllogism can go wrong, but Iwill not address them in the following. The Stoic models are characterized by the use of the concepts of assent/consent/free will. They proceedf rom strictly Stoic intellectualism towards Augustinianism, and further from Augustinianism towards voluntarism. While the full-fledged free will models are no longer Stoic, the Augustinian models that employ the interplay of desire and consent still display some Stoic features.
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Fourth,the role of Martin Luther in thishistory needs to be explained. In some sense, he doesnot belong to it, since he did not write anything on akrasia. In my new book, Iask the inevitable question: why not, given that he knew Aristotlewell and wassointerested in the so-called bondage of the will. My answer is that, for Luther, akrasia wasnot aconceptual option in the first place. 13 Why is this so?For Aristotle, akrasia and enkrateia,the strength of will, are imperfectstages of virtue and vice. Imperfectly good people act virtuously but havet emptations to do otherwise. They are called enkratic or (in Latin) continent. Imperfectly evil people commit sins but they act against their better judgment,being akratic. In Aristotle, we thus havef our moral states,v irtue, continence,a krasia, and vice.
For Luther, however, all people without grace are wholeheartedly evil and sinful; there are no alleviating factors. For this reason, peoplewho claim to be akratic are just normally evil and maybe hypocrites. When people are justified and liveaChristian life, they act rightly but their ruledsin nevertheless tempts them all the time. They are righteous and sinner at the same time. In Aristotelian terms, they are continent rather than virtuous. If Christianslapse from the good course of life, they re-enter the state of normal sinners. When theyreturn to the path of faith and Christianity,t hey becomer ighteous sinnerso rcontinent in Aristotelianterms. Only in heaven can they become really good and virtuous. The four Aristotelian moral states are thus reduced to twoinLuther, namely, vice and continence. Given this, Luther need not write anything concerning people who without grace nevertheless havegood judgment:there are no such people.
Early Lutheranism
We can also bluntly say that Luther kicked Aristotle out of the door. The philosopher starts to creep back from one window opened by Melanchthon and another opened by Calvin. Melanchthon doesn ot write much thematically on akrasia. For the most part, he shares Luther'sv iew that only sinfulness and continenceare the real Christian options. Melanchthon'sportrayal of the human will is Lutheran rather than Erasmian or Humanist. 14 In the second aetas of the Loci communes,however, Melanchthonundertakes some moderations to Luther'st eaching concerning the natural powers of humanity without grace.Heconsiders that people can havearemnant of judgment with which they can proceed to externally good works. The weakness of our nature frequently overcomes any good judgment, so that we follow evil affects. Medea'sw ords: Isee the better and approveit, but follow the worse,exemplify this situation. Medea'swords are not used in medieval theology and philosophy, but they are reintroduced by Josse Clichtoveinhis influential ethics textbook around 1500 as an illustrationo fa krasia. After Clichtove and Melanchthon, they are used by practically all later writers. 16 More importantly, they were used as an example of weakness of will, not as any example whatsoever. Melanchthon is very fond of Medea'se xample; he interprets Medea'sl ovea nd her rage in several different works throughout his later career as Reformer. 17 Let us keep in mind that Medea's words arenon-Aristotelian: if Medea really saw the better, without any ignorance or forgetting, she, according to Aristotle'si ntellectualist theory, should have followed this course. Medea exemplifies something that is called clear-eyed akrasia in philosophical literature.
We know todayh ow the example of Medea wase mployed in the Stoic discussion on akrasia.
18 Therefore,weneed to ask whether the reintroductionofthis example by Clichtoveand Melanchthon implies the reintroduction of Stoicism into the discussion on weakness of will. Several qualifications are here needed,as Medea'se xample can be understood as beings imply voluntarist. In some respects, Melanchthon'si nterpretation resembles Aristotelianism: the akratic Medea ignores the good judgment at the very moment of her sinfula ction. Melanchthonsometimes says that the devil causes this ignorance of particulars.
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On the other hand, Melanchthon knew the Greek sources so well that he probably realized that the example of Medea manifests Stoic rather than Aristotelian action theory. The frequentuse of this example turns, Ithink, his action theory to some extentt owards the Stoa. Melanchthon'ss ignificance in the interpretation history of akrasia lies, however, primarily in his ability to reconnect the classical discussion with the emerging Lutheran theology.H is use of the relevant examples is eclectic and rhetorical rather than fully consistent.
The first Lutheran to develop as ophisticated,o riginal and highly traditionconscious notion of akrasia is Melanchthon'spupil Joachim Camerarius. He is clearly am ajor figure not only in Lutheranism, but also in the entire interpretation history of akrasia in We stern philosophy. His insights radiate far and libertatem efficiendae civilis iustitiae saepe vinci naturali imbecillitate, saepe impediri a Diabolo. Nam cum natura sit plena malorum affectuum, saepe obtemperant homines pravis cupiditatibus, non recto iudicio. Sicut inquit apud Poetam Medea: Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor. Praeterea Diabolus captivam naturam impellit ad varia flagitia etiam externa, sicut videmus summos viros, qui tamen conati sunt honestevivere, lapsus turpissimos habere. Sed tamen inter has difficultates, utcunque reliqua est aliqua libertas efficiendae iustitiae civilis.' 16 Saarinen,W eakness (see n. 1), pp. 79-83 (Clichtove). deep, up to such founding fathers of modernity as Spinoza and Leibniz. 20 HereI can onlyv ery briefly sketch some basic features of Camerarius's Exposition of Nicomachean Ethics.
Camerarius knows well the Platonic and Stoic traditions, but he adheres to Aristotelianism, which he attempts to harmonizewith Melanchthon'stheological and philosophical insights. He keeps the structure of the practical syllogism and argues, in keeping with the Aristotelian tradition, that the particular facts of the minor premise are not grasped properly in the akratic deliberation. Thus, some ignorance precedes akratic acts. Unlike the former Aristotelians, however, Camerarius considers that the uncertainty relatedtoour perception of empirical particular is nothing less than 'the cause of all evil'. 21 He gives three new and non-Aristotelian examples of akrasia, which signify this circumstance in av ery broad manner. Am edical doctor knows well the general regularities regarding how to treat fever. However, it is very difficult to know which general principle applies to this particular case of fever. Therefore, he often fails to heal, as the medical knowledgeconcerning particulars is not certain. The second example concerns political leadership,inwhich even wise men often fail for the same reason: theyk now the general rules, but they cannot foresee whether they work properly in this particular case. Athird example concerns the composition of literary texts: even very skillful authors make all kinds of blunders, as the procedure from general stylistic and rhetorical rules to concrete cases of writing convincingly is so hard to accomplish. 22 The error of the akratic person thus concerns the particular circumstances: the devil is in the details. In somesense, this is close to the Aristotelian syllogistic model, but Camerarius is so focused on the uncertainty of particulars that we cannot call him Aristotelian. 23 The neglect of the particularsisalso voluntary, as the following quote shows:
The [akratic] argument goes as follows: this desire is harmful. Harmfulthingsare to be avoided. Therefore, one should not be seized by this desire. But covetousness carries the person away, so that he is ordered by this last propositionconcerningperception:this is pleasant and joyful. Therefore, Ienjoy the present pleasure. The person does not want to hear or follow the knowledge-based truth, which argues that such deeds are wicked and blameworthy. In the samemanner, one can explain other cases in which one acts against true knowledge and right reason. 24 These considerations of Camerarius advance significantlyfrom the schematic treatments of Luther and Melanchthon. At the same time, they differ from the earlier Aristoteliant radition. The weight of empirical particulars and the uneasiness provided by small changesi ss omething that we encounterl ater in Leibniz, for instance, but it is not amain theme before Camerarius. Because of the voluntary nature of the neglect of details, Camerarius is closer to late medieval voluntarism than to either Aristotle or the Stoa. It is worthwhile to note that while Luther denies akrasia completely and Melanchthon offers it aminor role in our external behavior, Camerarius makes akrasia the cause of all evil. The topic that has no conceptual place in Luther thus soon becomes prominent in Lutheranism and receives new significance as agroundofempirical observation.
After Camerarius, Lutherans start to write extensively on akrasia. They often return to the Aristotelian and even Thomistic doctrines and do not display much originality. They aim to make Aristotelianism compatible with the theological doctrineso ft he Reformation, sometimes even managing to do some creative work towards this goal. Theophilus Golius of Strasbourg and Wo lfgang Heider of Jena can be mentioned as examples of thisd evelopment. They return to the Aristoteliananthropology, although they continuetouse the example of Medea and stress the sinfulnature of all human beings. In reality, however, their Aristotelian anthropologyisclearly distinct from Luther'sreductionist doctrineofall humans beingeither wicked or enkratic. 25 
Early Calvinism
The Calvinist interpretation history of weakness of will is fascinating for many reasons. First, Calvin himself launches this history through discussing akrasia already in the 1539 edition of his Institutio. Second,Lambert Daneau undertakes an original systematic interpretation of akrasia and enkrateia in his Ethices Christianae. Third, the Neo-Stoic influenceo nt his discussion seems to be stronger in Calvinism than in the Catholic and Lutheran interpretation history.
Calvin'st reatment shows familiarity with the basic Reformation ideas of Luther and Melanchthon. Calvin discusses akrasia in the context of the so-called theological use of the law. This use brings the knowledge of sin. He emphasizes the role of conscience as an instance that exercisessome influenceevenincorrupted human minds. Calvin concludes therefore, in keeping with Melanchthon, that although sinners try to evade their inner power of judgment, the mind at least sometimes opens itself to the judgment of conscience. This means that we do not onlysin from ignorance and that genuine acting against better judgment is 25 Saarinen,W eakness (see n. 1), pp. 151-163 (Golius and Heider). possible because of the remainingp ower of conscience to produce such jugdments.
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This leads Calvin to present an Aristoteliansolution to the problem of akrasia in terms of practical syllogism. Although he attributesthis model to Aristotle's pupil Themistius, it can be found in the standard Aristotelian commentaries, for instance, in Thomas Aquinas or Calvin'scontemporary John Mair. 27 Calvin says:
Themistius more correctly teaches that the intellect is very rarely deceived in general definition or in theessence of the thing; but that it is illusory when it goes farther, that is, applies the principle to particular cases. In reply to the general question, every man will affirm that murder is evil. But he who is plottingthe death of an enemy contemplates murder as something good. The adulterer will condemn adultery in general, but will privately flatterhimself in his own adultery. Herein is man'signorance: when he comes to aparticular case, he forgets the general principlethat he has just laid down.
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In this manner, the conscience illuminates the majorpremises but not the minor ones and the sin is indeed to some extent due to ignorance. However, Calvin adds another perspectivetothis discussion as follows: Themistius' rule, however, is not without exception. Sometimest he shamefulness of evil-doing presses upon the conscience so that one, imposing upon himself no false image of the good, knowingly and willingly rushes headlong into wickedness. Out of such adisposition of mind come statements like this: 'Isee what is better and approveit, but Ifollow the worse.' To my mind Aristotle has made av ery keen distinction between incontinence and intemperance: where incontinence reigns, he says, the disturbed mental state or passion so deprives the mind of particular knowledge that it cannotmark the evil in its own misdeed, which it generally discerns in like instances; when the perturbations ubsides, repentance straightway returns. Intemperance, however, is not extinguished or shattered by the awareness of sin, but on the contrary, stubbornly persists in choosing its habitual evil.
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Calvin now employs the favorite example of Melanchthon, namely, Medea's love. As clear-eyed wrongdoing, Medea is for Calvin not acase of akrasia but of intemperance,which in the Aristotelianscale is astandard vice. The passage is somewhati diosyncratic or at least non-Aristotelian, as for Aristotle, people performing such wrongdoing are not conscious of the better alternativebut their mind is entirely fixed on wrongdoing. For our interpretation history it is nevertheless significant that the topic of akrasia is discussed by Calvin and that he 
